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Statement Showing the Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court: 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Constitution article VIII, section 4, which provides that "The Supreme Court by rule shall 
govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to practice law." 
Statement of the Issues Presented for Review: 
Issue One: Whether the district court erred in staying an attorney's suspension 
for intentionally engaging in professional misconduct involving dishonesty, and instead 
imposing a period of probation. The standard of review for sanctions imposed for 
professional misconduct in attorney discipline actions is a correctness standard, but the 
Utah Supreme Court may make an independent judgment regarding the appropriate 
level of discipline if the evidence warrants it. See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 
1997). This issue was preserved through oral argument during the sanctions hearing. 
(R. 189 at 90-91; 100-101) 
Issue Two: Whether the district court erred in giving undue weight to mitigating 
factors such as restitution, remorse, and candor to the court. The standard of review for 
sanctions imposed for professional misconduct in attorney discipline actions is a 
correctness standard, but the Utah Supreme Court may make an independent 
judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline if the evidence warrants it. See In 
re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). The issue was preserved through oral argument 
during the sanctions hearing. (R. 189 at 92-101) 
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Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, and Rules 
Rule 2. Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
Rule 3. Factors to Be Considered in Imposing Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
Rule 4. Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
Rule 6. Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline case. 
The Course of Proceedings: The case originated in a disciplinary action against 
Steven Crawley. (R. 1-14) The matter came before the trial court in a combined 
adjudication and sanctions hearing on November 7, 2005. (R. 154). The case was 
transferred to Judge Lindberg. Pursuant to a motion from the Office of Professional 
Conduct ("OPC"), the trial court entered Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order of Discipline. (R. 154-165) This appeal ensued. (R. 179-180) By Order of 
this Court on July 13, 2006, this appeal was consolidated with In re Henderson. 
Disposition in the Trial Court: Crawley was suspended for a period of one year, 
but the suspension was stayed and Crawley was placed on probation for a period of 
eighteen months subject to certain conditions. (R. 162-164). 
STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS 
Crawley was a shareholder of the law firm Babcock, Bostwick, Scott, Crawley 
and Price ("the firm"). (R. 155) One of the firm's clients was Interwest Construction. 
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(R. 155) 
Crawley represented Interwest Construction in two matters relevant to this case-
Case One, denominated Pettit Distribution Centers v. Interwest Construction ("the Pettit 
Distribution matter"), and Case Two, denominated Toothman-Orton Engineering v. 
Interwest Construction ("the Toothman-Orton matter"). (R. 155) 
The Pettit Distribution matter involved a primary claim against Interwest 
Construction, and Interwest Construction's three third-party claims against other 
entities. (R. 156) Each of these matters would have been enhanced by obtaining an 
expert report or affidavit, but Crawley failed to obtain either one. (R. 156) 
In the Fall of 2001 in the Pettit Distribution matter, Interwest Construction lost 
some of its third-party claims for lack of any supporting evidence, including an expert 
report, and the court assessed attorneys' fees against Interwest Construction in two of 
the third-party claims. (R. 156) Crawley failed to inform Interwest Construction that its 
third-party claims were dismissed, and that attorneys' fees had been assessed against 
it. (R. 156) Also in the Pettit Distribution matter, the court granted partial summary 
judgment against Interwest Construction in March 2002, and the lack of an expert report 
was part of the reason. (R. 156) 
Crawley misrepresented the status of the Pettit Distribution matter to Interwest 
Construction. (R. 156) Crawley also misrepresented the status of the Pettit Distribution 
matter to the firm. (R. 156) 
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The Toothman-Orton matter involved an action against Interwest Construction 
for breach of contract. (R. 156) Interwest Construction counterclaimed against 
Toothman-Orton for breach of contract and negligence. (R. 157) 
Interwest Construction's defense against the primary claim and its prosecution of 
the negligence counterclaim against Toothman-Orton depended upon obtaining an 
expert report or affidavit. (R. 157) 
On May 2, 2001, the District Court entered summary judgment against Interwest 
Construction on its negligence cross-claim because Interwest Construction failed to 
present an expert affidavit showing Toothman-Orton's cross-claim. The Court noted 
that its "review of the undisputed facts giving rise to the alleged malpractice in this case 
demonstrates that the matter is not of the kind within the ordinary knowledge and 
experience of laymen.... Interwest was therefore required to present an expert affidavit 
to show any negligence by Toothman-Orton. ... Because it failed to do so, summary 
judgment will be granted in favor of Toothman-Orton on Interwest's negligence cross-
claim." (R. 157) Crawley informed Interwest Construction that its counterclaim was 
dismissed for reasons other than the actual reason. (R. 157) 
In September 2001, an Amended Judgment was entered for Toothman-Orton 
against Interwest Construction in the amount of $17,007.31. (R. 157) 
Interwest Construction decided to pursue an appeal. (R. 157) Crawley 
informed Interwest Construction that the firm would appeal the judgment, and in fact 
had filed an appeal on its behalf in the Toothman-Orton matter. (R. 157) Crawley did 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not file an appeal on behalf of Interwest Construction in the Toothman-Orton matter. 
(R. 158) 
At the time relevant to this proceeding, Crawley was responsible for the firm's 
business affairs and financial management, including renewing its professional 
negligence insurance coverage through its insurance company. (R. 158) 
In November 2001, Crawley filled out a renewal application and checked the box 
marked "No" in response to the following question: "At this time, does any applicant 
know of any act, omission, or circumstance that could reasonably give rise to a 
professional liability claim against any of the following: the firm, any past or present 
attorneys in the firm, or any predecessor firm." (R. 158) 
The application form asserted "The above statements are true and the Applicant 
has not misstated, omitted, or suppressed any material fact(s). It is understood and 
agreed that this Renewal/Anniversary Application and any previously completed 
Renewal/Anniversary Application(s) and/or Application(s) shall be the basis of the 
contract with the Company and that this Renewal Anniversary Application, previously 
completed Renewal/Anniversary Application(s) shall be incorporated into that contract." 
(R. 158) Crawley signed the application as the "Authorized Principal or Applicant." (R. 
158) 
Crawley should have been aware that his acts and omissions in representing 
Interwest Construction in the Pettit Distribution matter and the Toothman-Orton matter 
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could reasonably give rise to a professional liability claim against the firm and/or against 
Crawley, but did not disclose this. (R. 159) 
Based upon the foregoing facts, the District Court in the disciplinary matter 
against Crawley concluded that he violated Rule 1.1 (Competence), Rule 1.2(a) (Scope 
of Representation), Rule 1.3 (Diligence), Rule 1.4(a) (Communication), Rule 8.4(c) 
(Misconduct), and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. (R. 
159) It also found that suspension is the appropriate presumptive sanction after taking 
into consideration the four factors listed under Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions. (R. 159) 
The court found the following aggravating factors: multiples offenses; the 
multiple offenses involved elements of intentional dishonesty, either in the form of 
affirmative misrepresentations, or omissions. (R. 159) Additionally, the court found "a 
third aggravating circumstance is probably Mr. Crawley's substantial experience." (R. 
159) 
The court also found the following mitigating factors: Crawley had no other 
discipline for twenty-eight years; he was suffering from physical, personal, and 
emotional problems; restitution has been made, albeit after the fact and not on his own 
initiative; he enjoys a good character reputation in the community by those who he is in 
a position to know; he has displayed substantial remorse. (R. 159-160) 
The Court found two additional factors: Crawley's candor to the court. (R. 160) 
The court stated that it "thinks he has been absolutely candid and has not done 
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anything to evade responsibility." (R. 160) Additionally, Crawley suffered a substantial 
loss of value in the firm, which the court understood to equate closely to restitution. 
The court also alluded to "the question of the imposition of other penalties and 
sanctions." (R. 160) 
Based on its findings of fact, the court made the following conclusions of law: 
Crawley violated Rule 1.1 (Competence), Rule 1.2(a) (Scope of Representation), Rule 
1.3 (Diligence), Rule 1.4(a) (Communication), Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct), and Rule 8.4(a) 
(Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. (R. 160) Taking into consideration 
the four factors listed under Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, 
suspension is the appropriate presumptive sanction. (R. 160) The court concluded, 
however, that the suspension should be stayed and Crawley placed on probation, with 
conditions, for a period of eighteen months. (R. 161) This became the Order of 
Discipline. (R. 162-164) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In the OPC's view, probation is not an appropriate sanction when an attorney 
knowingly, or knowingly and intentionally, engaged in professional misconduct involving 
dishonesty, particularly when there were significant aggravating factors including multiple 
offenses and dishonest motives. Probation is a sanction that should be reserved for 
professional misconduct that lends itself to correction, with a respondent willing to 
cooperate, and not employed for conduct giving rise to questions about the attorney's 
fundamental integrity. 
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The Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") identify and define 
probation as a sanction for professional misconduct, but do not provide guidance 
concerning when probation may or should be imposed. Compare Rule 2, Standards, with 
Rule 4, Standards. The OPC considers probation a useful tool for correcting practice 
errors that arise from ignorance or lack of diligence or communication. Conversely, the 
OPC views probation unsuitable as a sanction for conduct involving knowing or intentional 
dishonesty with clients or courts. Consistent with this approach, the OPC last year 
determined not to appeal a District Court decision imposing probation in a setting 
involving negligence. 
Recently, however, two District Court decisions have imposed or permitted 
probation for severe breaches of the attorneys' duties of honesty in various aspects of 
their practices. Although they differ in their particulars, each of the cases involved the 
respondent's knowing and intentional dishonesty to clients, third-parties, or to a tribunal. 
Because of its serious concerns about fairness to respondents and the desirability of 
promoting consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for similar offenses, as 
well as its concerns about protecting the public and the administration of justice, the OPC 
seeks review of the District Court decision in this case and in In re Henderson, which has 
been consolidated herewith. The OPC asks the Court to articulate criteria for the 
imposition of probations, thereby providing guidance to the OPC and the District Courts, 
and urges some particular standards for the Court's consideration. Finally, if the Court 
concludes that the District Court erred in placing Crawley on probation, it requests that the 
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Court reverse that portion of the Order, and require Crawley to serve a one-year 
suspension. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT'S GUIDANCE IS NEEDED CONCERNING CRITERIA FOR 
IMPOSING PROBATIONS 
A. Appropriate Sanctions Are the Linchpins of an Effective Attorney 
Discipline System, and Probation Has Its Place 
An effective attorney discipline system depends upon appropriate and consistently 
applied sanctions for professional misconduct. The American Bar Association's Joint 
Committee on Professional Sanctions stated it this way: 
For lawyer discipline to be truly effective, sanctions must be based on 
clearly developed standards. Inappropriate sanctions can undermine the 
goals of lawyer discipline: sanctions which are too lenient fail to adequately 
deter misconduct and thus lower public confidence in the profession; 
sanctions which are too onerous may impair confidence in the system and 
deter lawyers from reporting ethical violations on the part of other lawyers. 
Inconsistent sanctions, either within a jurisdiction or among jurisdictions, 
cast doubt on the efficiency and the basic fairness of all disciplinary 
systems. 
I.A., Preface, ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (as amended Feb. 1992). 
In Utah, the explicit purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings "is to ensure and 
maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those who undertake the 
discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers and to protect the public and the 
administration of justice from those who have demonstrated by their conduct that they are 
unable or unlikely to properly discharge their professional responsibilities." Rule 1(a), 
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Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"); see also Rule 1.1, Standards. To this 
end, the Court adopted the Standards in 1993. See Compiler's Notes, Standards. 
The Standards constitute a system "designed for use in imposing a sanction or 
sanctions following a determination that a member of the legal profession has violated a 
provision of the Rules of Professional Conduct." Rule 1.3, Standards. They allow for 
"flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular cases of lawyer misconduct" 
and are designed to promote consideration of all relevant factors and their appropriate 
weight "in light of the stated goals of lawyer discipline." Rule 1.3, Standards. 
B. The Standards Identify Probation as a Possible Sanction, But Provide 
No Framework Concerning the Circumstances Under Which Probation 
Is Appropriate 
Rule 2 of the Standards is titled "Sanctions," and identifies discipline ranging from 
the most to the least severe: disbarments, suspensions, reprimands, admonitions. See 
Rule 2, Standards. The list of possible sanctions also includes resignation with discipline 
pending, reciprocal discipline, and probation. See id. Each sanction is defined in the 
rule, except for a short list of "Other sanctions and remedies" that includes restitution, the 
assessment of costs, and the like. See id. As defined in Rule 2, "Probation is a sanction 
that allows a lawyer to practice law under specified conditions. Probation can be public or 
nonpublic, can be imposed alone or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be 
imposed as a condition of readmission or reinstatement." Rule 2.7, Standards. 
Another rule in the Standards identifies the circumstances under which 
disbarments, suspensions, reprimands, and admonitions are the appropriate presumptive 
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sanction. See Rule 4, Standards. Rule 4 does not offer guidance concerning when 
probation is an appropriate sanction, nor does it identify the circumstances under which 
the sanctions of resignation with discipline pending and reciprocal discipline should be 
imposed. See id. Procedures for seeking resignations with discipline pending and 
reciprocal discipline are identified by specific rules in the RLDD, but the RLDD do not 
address probation. See Rule 21 (Resignation with Discipline Pending), RLDD; Rule 22 
(Reciprocal Discipline), RLDD. Thus, probation is the only sanction other than the list of 
"Other sanctions and remedies," with no corresponding rule in the Standards identifying 
when it is appropriate, or a rule in the RLDD identifying how it may be imposed. 
C. Although Probations or Their Equivalent Have Long Been Available in 
Utah, The Question of When to Impose Them Appears to Be a Matter 
of First Impression 
Probations or their functional equivalent—stayed suspensions1—were not explicitly 
identified among the sanctions noted in the body of rules that preceded today's RLDD 
and Standards, but were available under the Supreme Court's inherent powers. See e.g. 
Rules of Conduct and Discipline of the Utah State Bar, effective Nov. 1931 (Board of Bar 
Commissioners could recommend reprimand, suspension, or disbarment, and Supreme 
Court may exercise its inherent powers and "take any action agreeable to its judgment"); 
Rules V and VI, section 51, Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, 
1
 Because a stayed suspension with conditions which, if not met, would trigger 
reinstatement of the suspension, the OPC regards stayed suspensions as the 
functional equivalent of probations. Courts and other tribunals do not appear to draw a 
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effective Mar. 1940. 
The OPC's review of Supreme Court opinions concerning lawyer discipline 
revealed only a handful of cases in which probation was imposed or alluded to, but none 
in which the Court discussed criteria that would make probation an appropriate option. 
See e.g. In re Stoddard, 793 P.2d 373, 374-375, 377 (Utah 1990) (suspension stayed 
and probation imposed for unintentional lack of diligence, but attorney violated conditions 
and probation was revoked); In re Knowlton, 800 P.2d 806, 807, 809-810 (Utah 1990) 
(attorney intentionally converted funds belonging to one client as payment for a debt 
owed by another client; Court imposed six-month suspension, with five months stayed on 
condition of payment of restitution and costs);2 In re Johnson, 830 P.2d 262, 262-263 
(Utah 1992) (opinion alluded to attorney's probation by consent for what appear to have 
been diligence and communication problems, but probation was revoked and this case 
involved allegations of attorney practicing while suspended); In re Schwenke, 849 P.2d 
573, 575 (Utah 1993) (opinion noted Court's acceptance of Bar recommendation to place 
attorney on supervised probation for neglect of two matters; this case addressed 
allegations concerning attorney's failure to comply with Court orders); In re Cassity, 875 
more rigorous distinction between the two, and this Brief will not attempt to further 
distinguish them. 
2
 Justice Stewart's opinion included a footnote stating that "a six-month suspension, even 
if five months is stayed, is oppressive and unreasonable." Id. at 810 n.5. He added, 
"Petitioner's conduct is not, in my view, that egregious." Id. He also cautioned that "it is 
ill-advised to impose an over long period of suspension and then stay part of it to gain 
leverage to compel an attorney to comply with other specific remedies. There are ample 
means to compel compliance short of that." Id. 
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P.2d 548, 548 (Utah 1994) (public reprimand and six months' probation for case 
prosecuted as fee dispute).3 
D. The American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions Include Probation as a Potential Discipline But Do Not 
Provide Criteria for Employing It 
Utah's Standards are a substantially revised and streamlined version of the 
American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA's 
Standards"). See Summary, Standards; In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 212. Their 
purposes "are nonetheless the same." Babilis, 951 P.2d at 212. 
The ABA's Standards identify probation among the possible sanctions for 
professional misconduct. See Standard 2.7, ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions, as amended Feb. 1992. The language of the ABA's probation provision 
differs from the one employed in Utah, but its effect is similar: "Probation is a sanction 
that allows a lawyer to practice under specified conditions. Probation can be imposed 
alone or in conjunction with a reprimand, an admonition or immediately following a 
suspension. Probation can also be imposed as a condition of readmission or 
reinstatement." Id. Notably, the ABA Standards do not include a suggested framework 
for determining when probation is appropriate, nor do they offer guidance concerning 
how it should be imposed. 
This case is discussed in greater detail below. 
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E. Probation Is Available In Most Other States, But the Criteria for 
Imposing It Vary 
With some exceptions, the disciplinary rules of other states include probation 
among the range of sanctions available for attorney misconduct. The OPC has compiled 
summary information concerning these rules. See Summary Chart of State Rules 
Governing Probations and Stayed Suspensions, a copy of which is provided in the 
Addendum. Conceptually, the states may be divided into those in which probation is not 
provided for under the rules governing attorney discipline but the courts sometimes 
impose it pursuant to their inherent authority; those in which probation is available under 
conditions specified in the rules; and those, such as Utah, in which probation is explicitly 
provided for, but no criteria are identified in the rules. 
1. Some Jurisdictions Have Rules Permitting Probation Only When 
Specified Conditions Have Been Satisfied 
Jurisdictions with rules permitting probation often identify conditions that must be 
satisfied before probation can be imposed. These often include a proviso that probation 
may only be imposed if there is little likelihood of harm to the public. See e.g. Rule 8(h), 
Ala. R. of Disciplinary Pro. Others include a proviso that the conditions of probation must 
be adequately supervised. See e.g. Section 17E(7), Ark. Sup. Ct. Pro. of Regulating 
Conduct of Attorneys at Law. 
Even where probation is permitted under certain conditions, the rules in other 
jurisdictions usually are silent concerning the underlying misconduct and mental state for 
which probation may be imposed. The exception is that a handful of rules in other 
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jurisdictions expressly limit probations to conduct that would not warrant disbarment. See 
e.g. Rule 251.7, Colo. R. Civ. Pro. As far as the OPC can tell, Texas is the only state with 
more finely calibrated criteria related to the misconduct itself. See Rule 15.11, Texas R. 
of Disciplinary Pro. (probation cannot be used if respondent received public reprimand or 
fully probated suspension in last five years for same rule violations, or two fully probated 
suspensions in last five years, or received two public reprimands in last five years for 
conflict of interest, theft, or failure to return clearly unearned fee). 
2. Reported Cases From Other Jurisdictions Sometimes Offer a 
Useful Perspective on Probation as a Disciplinary Sanction 
The OPC's search for reported cases involving probation as a disciplinary sanction 
revealed numerous cases in which probation was employed without comment from the 
court concerning the underlying misconduct and attorney's mental state that might 
warrant such a sanction. Several cases were more helpful in articulating the courts' 
reasoning, however, and these are summarized here. 
In its first such decision, In re Jantz, the Supreme Court of Kansas4 considered 
whether to stay the suspension of an attorney who converted client funds and lied to a 
judge about it. See In re Jantz, 763 P.2d 626, 772-773 (Kan. 1988) (noting that the 
court had "not used probation nor have we 'suspended' the execution of such 
suspension."). Pursuant to the Kansas Supreme Court Rules Relating to Discipline of 
Attorneys, which provide for disbarment, suspension, censure, or informal admonition, 
4
 Kansas is a jurisdiction in which probation is not explicitly provided by rule. 
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and "[a]ny other form of discipline or conditions separate from or connected to any type 
of discipline stated above, . . . which the Supreme Court deems appropriate,"5 the 
Kansas Supreme Court adopted the hearing panel's recommendation. See id. at 775-
776. The court emphasized, however, that the case was "unique" because of the many 
mitigating circumstances,6 and noted that it had "rarely failed to disbar or suspend any 
attorney whose professional misconduct parallels that of the respondent." Id. at 775. 
The unique circumstances were these: 
The conduct complained of here took place within a very short period of 
time; there were no complaints against respondent prior to these 
incidents. These took place when respondent was under severe 
emotional distress, caused by the terminal illness of his father and his own 
financial problems. Mr. Jantz admitted his misconduct to the judge 
promptly. He has admitted the misconduct to his client and to the bar 
where he practices. He made prompt restitution of the funds, which were 
not at that time due the client but were paid by him into the hands of the 
clerk of the district court, to await further order of the court. By the time 
the disciplinary proceedings were underway, Jantz had already made 
restitution, had commenced professional counseling (which is continuing), 
and had prepared a plan for retirement of his debts and financial 
obligations. We were told at the time of oral argument that he has made a 
substantial reduction of his obligations since the panel hearing in March of 
this year. His practice is growing, indicating that he is accepted by the 
members of the bench and bar as well as the residents of the community 
where he resides and practices. 
Since then, the Kansas Supreme Court has rejected other requests for 
probation, noting that "unique" circumstances are those "from which it reasonably could 
5
 Rule 203(a)(5), Kan. Sup. Ct. R. Relating to Discipline of Attorneys. 
6
 Apparently there were no aggravating factors, either. 
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be inferred that the attorney's misconduct was a one-time response to adversity and 
that it would be highly unlikely that he would repeat his mistake." See e.g. In re 
Scimeca, 962 P.2d 1080, 1090 (Kan 1998) (indefinitely suspended respondent, among 
other things, for engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and for 
misconduct in dealing with clients, notwithstanding his contention that he suffers from 
depression and is treating it, has filed personal and business bankruptcies, his son 
suffers from a head injury, he apologized to the judge, and the incident involving the 
judge was isolated). 
In New Hampshire,7 the Supreme Court considered probation for an attorney's 
trust account violations that involved among other things, commingling and failures to 
maintain proper trust account records. See In re Morgan's Case, 727 A.2d 985, 987 
(N.H. 1999). Although the attorney's "apparent ignorance of the rules cannot justify 
their violation," the court concluded that the mitigating factors included self-reporting, 
remedial efforts, stipulation to the facts, a lack of prior discipline, and absence of harm, 
warranted a conditionally delayed suspension. Id. The court observed: "It is significant 
that the respondent's actions were not motivated by dishonesty, for attorney misconduct 
involving dishonesty reflects most negatively on the legal profession and will not be 
tolerated." Id. (emphasis added). 
7
 New Hampshire is a jurisdiction without an explicit rule providing for probation. 
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In Oregon, the Supreme Court rejected probation for an attorney's intentional 
dishonesty with a client, noting that a condition of probation is only appropriate when 
there is a correlation between it and the ethical violation. See e.g. In re Butler, 921 P.2d 
401, 404 (Ore. 1996). It concluded that "a lengthy suspension will provide greater 
protection to the public." Id. More recently, the Supreme Court of Oregon "advise[d] the 
Bar that we do not favor probationary terms unless they are the result of stipulation. 
When a lawyer's misconduct is sufficiently serious to warrant a lengthy probationary 
period, the uncertainties of the monitoring process lead us to prefer, when appropriate, 
imposition of a sanction involving a concrete period of time." In re Obert, 89 P.3d 1173, 
1181 (Ore. 2004). 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota9 may grant probation, but "only [in] the most 
extreme, extenuating circumstances," such as physical illness that precipitated a severe 
depressive reaction which was causally related to the misconduct and had been 
remedied; the misconduct had been rectified; there was no indication of fraud or deceit; 
the attorney had made significant community contributions, and had no disciplinary 
history. See In re McCallum, 289 N.W.2d 146, 147 (Minn. 1980). 
Probation is imposed infrequently in the District of Columbia,10 and only when the 
respondents conduct was influenced by a remediable disability. See e.g. In re Bradbury, 
608 A.2d 1218, 1219 (D.C. 1992); see also In re Stow, 633 A.2d 782, (D.C. 1993) 
8
 Oregon has a rule providing for probation. 
9
 Minnesota's rules provide for probation. 
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(probation appropriate for neglect of practice in light of respondent's acquiescence in 
sanction) 
F. Probation Appears to Be Emerging As a Sanction Imposed Sua 
Sponte By the District Court 
Last year, the District Court imposed a one-year suspension upon an attorney 
who violated various Rules of Professional Conduct in several client matters, but 
granted the attorney leave to petition the court to stay all but three months on condition 
that she undergo supervision for up to nine months. See Ruling and Order Re: 
Sanctions, In re Lang, Case Nos. 010910847 and 030908681, March 28, 2005, a copy 
of which is supplied in the Addendum. The attorney had violated Rules 1.3 (Diligence), 
1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 8.4(d) 
(Misconduct), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct). See id. at 1. With the exception of her failure 
to respond to the OPC, none of the violations were intentional; some violations were 
knowing, others were merely negligent. See id. at 5-9. There were aggravating factors 
in the form of dishonest and selfish motives as to some misconduct; a pattern of 
misconduct; multiple offenses; obstruction of the disciplinary process; refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct; and substantial experience with 
respect to some matters. See id. at 9-12. Mitigating factors were: absence of a prior 
record (but this was accorded little weight); inexperience as to some of the matters; and 
interim reform. See id. at 12-15. The court found that suspension was the presumptive 
10
 Minnesota's rules provide for probation. 
10 
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sanction, although it noted that disbarment might be justified and appropriate. See id. 
at 15. 
The District Court "wrestled with its options," in the face of "the recurring question 
[of] just what sanction might give [the attorney] the best possible chance to make 
fundamental changes that could substantially improve her prospects of practicing law 
until retirement without being plagued by continuing allegations of professional 
misconduct." Id. at 15. The court explained its reasons for permitting the lawyer to 
petition for a stay: 
The OPC argues for a suspension of at least six months and one 
day, but the preferred sanction is a one year suspension. As already 
indicated, this court does not believe that the presumption of suspension 
is overcome in this case in any way that would justify the lesser sanctions 
urged by [the attorney]. Accordingly, the sanction must include 
suspension, but the court firmly believes that a suspension of six months, 
or even one year, without a more proactive component, will do anything to 
change [the attorney's] professional conduct in the long term. There must 
be a term of actual suspension to bring home the seriousness of this 
lawyer's misconduct, but the court determines that there must also be a 
period of supervised practice to give [the attorney] a chance to see how 
family law can and should be practiced at the highest levels of 
professional responsibility, with due regard for clients, other counsel, and 
the courts. 
Id. at 15-16. Ultimately, the attorney successfully petitioned for the stay of suspension. 
See Order Staying the Respondent's Suspension and Concerning the Respondent's 
Reinstatement to the Practice of Law Upon Termination of the Period of Suspension, In 
re Lang, Civil No. 010910847, a copy of which is included in the Addendum. 
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Although it had urged a sanction other than probation, the OPC concluded the 
District Court had not erred in imposing the suspension plus probation in the foregoing 
case. Indeed, the OPC has sometimes stipulated to proposals for a respondent's 
probation when the misconduct originated from something that clearly could be 
remedied and the OPC is also persuaded of the attorney's commitment to change and 
to cooperate. For example, negligent conduct in violation of the rule requiring a lawyer 
to "provide competent representation to a client;"11 negligent conduct in violation of the 
rule requiring lawyers to "act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 
a client;"12 negligent conduct in violation of the rule requiring a lawyer to keep a client 
reasonably informed about the status of the matter.13 In such circumstances, where it 
appears that appropriate additional training or mentoring would eliminate the problems 
without further injury to any client, probation is arguably the most effective means of 
securing long-term protection of the public. Significantly, progress can be reported, 
measured, and verified if necessary, thereby adequately insuring protection of the 
public, the courts, and the profession. 
G. The OPC Urges the Court to Exercise Its Special Role in Governing the 
Practice of Law By Providing the Guidance Requested 
Pursuant to Utah Constitution, the Supreme Court "plays a special role in 
governing the practice of law," which "includes overseeing the discipline of persons 
11
 Rule 1.1, R. Pro. Con. 
12
 Rule 1.3, R. Pro. Con. 
13
 Rule 1.4, R. Pro. Con. 
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admitted to practice law." In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998). Trial court 
findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, but the Court "reserve[s] the 
right to draw different inferences from the facts than those drawn by the trial court." Id. 
Significantly, "[w]ith respect to the discipline actually imposed, our constitutional 
responsibility requires [the Court] to make an independent determination as to its 
correctness." Id. In one of the first cases brought under the new disciplinary scheme 
inaugurated in 1993, the Court said, "Although we recognize as a general proposition the 
district court's advantaged position in overall familiarity with the evidence and the context 
of the case, on appeal we must treat the ultimate determination of discipline as our 
responsibility." Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 213. 
The Court has exercised this role in the past by providing guidance concerning 
how the Standards should be applied. For example, in the Ince case, the Court noted 
that "Although the new Standards are intended to preserve a measure of flexibility in 
assigning sanctions, the whole basis for their adoption was to avoid the uncertainty that 
existed under the old rules. Therefore, we offer the following guidance as to the 
application of aggravating and mitigating circumstances under rule 6 [of the Standards]." 
In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998) (aggravating and mitigating factors must be 
significant to warrant departing from presumptive level of discipline set forth in 
Standards). 
Justice Durham's concurring and dissenting opinion in another disciplinary matter, 
In re Johnson, elaborated upon the Court's role in attorney misconduct matters: 
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This court is charged by the Utah Constitution with the obligation to regulate 
the practice of law. We have delegated the screening, fact-finding, and 
initial judgment regarding discipline to the Utah State Bar and to the district 
courts, but we retain the final authority to oversee the system. When the 
prosecuting entity and the disciplined attorney accede to the 
appropriateness of the disciplinary sanction imposed by the trial courts, or 
at least fail to challenge it, we lend out constitutional authority to the finality 
of the determination. Such trial court decisions, of course, create no 
precedent for the disposition of other cases. Where a sanction is 
challenged, however, this court undertakes a function that goes beyond the 
review of an individual case. We arbitrate questions of proportionality, rules 
of law, and guidelines for the imposition of sanctions that have general 
application for the practice of law in Utah. Our decisions interpret the Rules 
of Professional Conduct and develop the principles of application that will 
guide lawyers, the Bar, and the trial courts. 
In re Johnson, 2001 UT 110, TJ 21 (Durham, J. , concurring and dissenting). Justice 
Durham also noted the trial courts' "more limited perspective on the disciplinary system" 
and observed that "[i]t is not at all unexpected that a trial judge's best assessment of the 
trend of developing law turns out to be 'wrong' in the sense that this court will reject it and 
opt for a different interpretation or policy." Id. at U 23. 
It is in this spirit that the OPC seeks review of the Crawley case and its companion 
case, In re Henderson. The Court's decision here will have a significant bearing on future 
disciplinary cases, as well as the cases in issue here. 
II. PROBATION SHOULD ONLY BE AVAILABLE FOR MISCONDUCT THAT IS 
AMENDABLE TO CORRECTION 
A. Probation Is an Appropriate Sanction for Some Misconduct 
Consistent with the goal of protecting the public and the administration of justice, 
probation is a means of ensuring that reform has occurred. Likewise, probation imposed 
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in conjunction with other sanctions and remedies, such as a requirement that the lawyer 
attend continuing education courses, or work under the supervision of another lawyer,14 is 
a significant tool for ensuring and maintaining high standards of professional conduct.15 
The factors for determining when to use probation are a more difficult question. 
Rule 4 of Utah's Standards identifies the presumptive sanctions for certain types of 
misconduct, but does not include probation as an appropriate presumptive sanction. 
See Rule 4, Standards. Accordingly, probation appears to be an appropriate final 
sanction—that is, a sanction ultimately imposed upon consideration of the factors 
identified in Rule 3 of the Standards, which include the duty violated, the lawyer's 
mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the misconduct, and aggravating 
and mitigating factors—but not a presumptive sanction. See Rule 3.1, Standards. 
Probation, then, is a legitimate ultimate solution, but when should it be imposed? 
B. The Factors Identified in Rule 3 of the Standards Should Be 
Considered in Imposing a Sanction of Probation 
Although the Standards are brief, being comprised of just six rules, they are 
nevertheless loaded with the criteria necessary for promoting a rational and thorough 
14
 Rule 2 of the Standards provides for the imposition of other sanctions and remedies, 
including "a requirement that a lawyer attend continuing education courses." Rule 2.9, 
Standards. 
15
 The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Professional Discipline has 
observed that if probation is not available as a sanction for lawyers in need of supervision 
but who could "perform useful services," the only choices are "suspension, which involves 
an unnecessary deprivation of the lawyer's livelihood, or continuation of practice, which 
involves a possible threat to the public." Louisiana State BarAss'n v. Longenecker, 532 
So.2d 1143, 164 n.1 (La. 1989). 
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consideration of all relevant factors. Rule 3 is the rule that explicitly draws together 
these factors: 
The following factors should be considered in imposing a sanction after a 
finding of lawyer misconduct: 
(a) The duty violated; 
(b) The lawyer's mental state; 
(c) The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; 
and 
(d) The existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
Rule 3.1, Standards. The sanctions of resignation with discipline pending and 
reciprocal discipline are not governed by Rule 3 because the factors are inapplicable, 
and they are addressed by explicit separate provisions of the RLDD. By contrast, the 
factors identified in Rule 3 are readily applicable in probation settings, and probation is 
not addressed by the RLDD. Accordingly, the Rule 3 factors should be considered in 
imposing the sanction of probation, and these are discussed below. 
Lawyers owe duties to clients, tribunals, the public, and the profession. These 
are not set forth in the Standards, but are embedded in the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. For example, duties to clients are inherent in the rules requiring an attorney 
to provide competent, diligent representation and adequate communication. See e.g. 
Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4, R. Pro. Con. A lawyer has a duty to maintain the integrity of 
the profession. See e.g. Rules 8.1 and 8.3, R. Pro. Con. Of particular significance for 
this case, a lawyer also owes duties of honesty and candor to tribunals and opposing 
counsel, as well as a duty of fairness to opposing parties. See e.g. Rules 8.4, 4.1, 4.4, 
R. Pro. Con. 
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As to the relevant mental states, these are identified and defined in the 
Standards: 
"Intent" is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular 
result, 
"Knowledge is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant 
circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or 
purpose to accomplish a particular result. 
"Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that 
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation 
from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the 
situation. 
Definitions, Standards. 
Injury may be actual or potential, and its level can range from "serious" to "little or 
no." See Definitions, Standards. Injury and potential injury includes harm to clients, the 
public, the legal system, or the profession. See id. 
The Standards set forth a non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances in Rule 6, and this Court has provided guidance concerning their 
existence and the weight they should be accorded. See Rule 6, Standards; see also 
e.g. In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1998). 
C. In the OPC's View, Probation Is Not Appropriate When the 
Respondent Has Intentionally or Knowingly Violated Duties of 
Honesty and Candor 
Employing the Rule 3 factors, the OPC has concluded that probation should not 
be available as a sanction when the duty violated was the duty to deal honestly with 
clients, tribunals, or third parties, and when the lawyer's mental state in committing the 
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misconduct was knowing or intentional. Further, probation is not appropriate when 
certain aggravating factors are present, a point addressed later. 
Any sanction should maintain respect for the profession and protect the public, 
and should be sufficient to prevent recurrence of the misconduct and deter others from 
engaging in similar misconduct. Moreover, the degree of discipline must correspond to 
the gravity of the misconduct. Collectively, the question is whether the discipline is 
appropriate in light of the nature of the misconduct, the cumulative weight of the 
disciplinary rule violations, the potential harm to the public, and the harm to the legal 
profession itself. 
With these considerations in mind, probations in disciplinary matters involving an 
attorney's intentional or knowing dishonesty are inappropriate because the misconduct 
reflects an absence of integrity that cannot be remedied with further training or 
supervision. Moreover, a respondent's reform cannot be verified. Indeed, absent 24-
hour supervision, a supervising attorney cannot possible know if there have been 
further misrepresentations or other lapses of integrity. 
The OPC's position derives in part from the seriousness with which the Court 
has treated discipline matters involving an attorney's lack of integrity in a variety of 
settings. See e.g. In re Norton, 146 P.2d 899, 900-901 (Utah 1944) (attorney "charged 
with an attempt to deceive this court" by intentionally misrepresenting that an exhibit 
had been admitted in evidence; although attempt was unsuccessful, the Court imposed 
one-year suspension); In re Bybee, 629 P.2d 423, 425 (Utah 1988) (attorney's lack of 
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truthfulness and candor to a court warranted a suspension; such conduct, "if allowed 
without proper restraint and punishment, would undermine our system of justice."); In re 
Cassity, 875 P.2d 548, 551 (Utah 1994) (had Cassity's misrepresentation to a court 
"been charged and prosecuted before the hearing as an independent act of professional 
misconduct, disbarment or suspension may have been appropriate, but that was not the 
case."). In his concurring opinion in Cassity, Chief Justice Zimmerman wrote, 
Conduct such as Cassity's factual misrepresentation to the court 
strikes at the heart of the legitimacy of the adversary system. The 
importance of a lawyer's obligation of candor to the tribunal cannot be 
overstated. Lawyers have an ethical obligation to be advocates for their 
clients, not to be their co-conspirators. . . . It would ignore reality to 
recognize that at times, cultural and economic pressures cause some 
lawyers to forget the distinction. . . . But when such conduct comes to 
light, I think it should be punished harshly to serve as continuing notice on 
errant members of the profession that we will not tolerate it. Severe 
punishment also assures the public that, despite the cynical teachings of 
popular culture that lawyers are prostitutes in nice clothing fit only for 
dinosaur food, in fact, lawyers are bound by rigid ethical standards which 
are designed to preserve the integrity of the adversary system. 
Cassity, 875 P.2d at 552 (citations omitted) (Zimmerman, J . , concurring). 
D. Probation Should Only Be Available When Certain Aggravating 
Factors Are Not Present 
Additionally, even in cases not involving misconduct based upon an attorney's 
intentional or knowing violation of duties of honesty, probation would not be appropriate 
when aggravating factors suggest that the respondent is unlikely to cooperate with the 
OPC and has not demonstrated the self-awareness that is a necessary component of a 
true commitment to change. In other words, an attorney whose misconduct was 
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dishonestly motivated, who denies responsibility, who engages in deceptive 
practices during the disciplinary proceeding,18 or who displays an uncooperative attitude 
toward the proceedings,19 is an unlikely candidate for the rehabilitative possibilities 
offered by probation. 
III. CRAWLEY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PLACED ON PROBATION GIVEN 
THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES VIOLATED AND THE AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
A. Crawley Intentionally Misled His Client, His Colleagues, and His 
Firm's Insurance Carrier 
Crawley repeatedly violated his duty of honesty to his client, his firm's insurance 
carrier, and his colleagues at the firm. He misrepresented the status of one matter to 
the client and to his firm; told the client that another matter was dismissed for reasons 
other than the actual reason; told the client that a matter had been appealed, when it 
had not; and in response to a direct question from his firm's insurance carrier, failed to 
inform the carrier that his acts and omissions could give rise to a professional liability 
claim. His affirmative representations and omissions were intentionally dishonest. 
These violations of Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides 
that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving 
Rule 6.2(b), Standards (dishonest motive is an aggravating circumstance). 
17
 Rule 6.2(f), Standards (refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of misconduct is an 
aggravating circumstance). 
18
 Rule 6.2(f), Standards (submission of false statements or evidence, or other deceptive 
practices during disciplinary process is an aggravating circumstance). 
19
 Rule 6.2(e), Standards (obstruction of disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing 
to comply with rules or orders is an aggravating circumstance). 
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dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation," were failures of an attorney's most 
fundamental duty to his client and to the profession. Moreover, as the aggravating 
factors demonstrate, Crawley's motive was dishonest with respect to the 
misrepresentations and omissions, and there were multiple offenses. 
B. The Court Gave Undue Weight to Some of the Mitigating Factors 
In the OPC's view, the Court Considered mitigating factors which either should 
not have been considered, or which were entitled to little if any weight. If these 
informed its decision to place Crawley on probation, this was in error. 
1. Crawley Made Restitution Only After the Fact and Not on His Own 
Initiative 
The District Court found and concluded as a mitigating circumstance that 
"[restitution has been made, albeit after the fact and not on his own initiative." (R. 160) 
Further, "Crawley has suffered what the Court accepts to be essentially a one hundred 
and fifty thousand dollar loss of value in the firm. The Court understands this equates 
very closely to the restitution element." (R. 160) 
The OPC believes the court erred in assigning Crawley's restitution and financial 
loss as a mitigating factor. Restitution is entitled to little weight if it is made, as in this 
matter, after a respondent's misconduct is discovered. See /nee, 957 P.2d at 1238. As 
this Court has stated, "After an attorney's misconduct is discovered, restitution can be 
characterized simply as the 'honesty of compulsion' and may be evidence only of the 
lawyer's ability to raise the money or desire to avoid being disbarred rather than of a 
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sincere desire to rectify the wrongdoing." Id.; see also Ennenga, 2001 UT 111, U 13 
(repaying client, though the right thing to do, not accomplished in way that mitigated 
misappropriation because attorney did it after forced to do so by threat of suit); Rule 
6.4(a), Standards ("forced or compelled restitution" is neither aggravating nor 
mitigating). 
2. The Fact That Crawley Did Not Deny Wrongdoing Does Not 
Constitute Remorse Within the Meaning of the Standards 
The District Court found and concluded that Crawley "has displayed substantial 
remorse." The dialogue between the court and counsel on this point demonstrates, 
however, that remorse was only evident at trial in the form of the absence of denial by 
Crawley: 
Ms. Toomey: With respect to remorse, there was no direct 
testimony of this from Mr. Crawley himself. In any event, the Supreme 
Court has said that it's entitled to negligible weight because anybody 
would be remorseful at trial. The question is did he demonstrate it before 
he got caught and there is no testimony of that. Did he tell anybody 
before they found out from other sources? He didn't tell the colleagues 
that he was apparently quite close to[.] [T]hey regarded him as a mentor, 
so it may not have been appropriate in that context, but he didn't tell his 
wife. 
So I think that the evidence—there isn't any evidence of remorse. 
The Court: I mean there clearly is perhaps not beforehand, but he 
is remorseful now. I guess I would say to you that you'd be surprised at 
the number of people that would take that stand in similar settings and not 
express any remorse or any belief that they have ever done anything 
wrong but they're just getting shanked. So, there is, I mean, there is 
certainly no acknowledgment that what this is[,] ["Jit's just the system, you 
know, I didn't do anything wrong. I don't have any personal 
responsibility^"] I guess that's my point is that's certainly present. 
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Ms. Toomey: Correct. 
The Court: There's no denial here of any wrongdoing whatsoever. 
Ms. Toomey: No, no. That's correct. 
(R. 189 at 99-100 (emphasis added)) 
This Court has indicated that "remorse at trial is irrelevant." Tanner, 960 P.2d at 
403; Stubbs, 974 P.2d at 300. It has explained, "Naturally, anyone going through a trial 
for [the respondent's] wrongdoing would feel remorse after getting caught. Instead, the 
remorse question closely relates to acknowledgement of wrongful conduct: did [the 
respondent] feel remorse about his behavior before getting caught, and was he 
motivated by remorse to make amends?" Tanner, 960 P.2d at 403 (emphasis added). 
Crawley did not deny wrongdoing, but his remorse was evident only after it became 
clear that his misconduct had been discovered, and made amends "after the fact and 
not on his own initiative." 
3. Crawley's Candor to the Court Is Not a Mitigating Factor 
The Court found and concluded that Crawley "has been absolutely candid and 
has not done anything to evade responsibility." This is not a mitigating factor within the 
meaning of the Standards. Any witness testifying in court is under oath and expected 
to be scrupulously honest. As such, a respondent's candor cannot be a mitigating 
factor; it is his duty. 
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CONCLUSION 
The ultimate responsibility for disciplinary cases lies with this Court, and in light of 
its unique role in regulating the profession, the OPC asks it for guidance concerning the 
underlying misconduct and the attorney's mental state for which probation is appropriate. 
Such guidance will provide enormous assistance to the OPC, the District Court, and 
future respondents, because it will promote consistency in sanctions for similar types of 
misconduct. 
If the OPC has correctly concluded that probation is inappropriate as a sanction for 
misconduct involving an attorney's breach of the fundamental duty of honesty to clients 
and others, the OPC asks the Court to adopt this as a bright-line test for determining the 
availability of probation. 
Additionally, if the Court concludes that the District Court erred in placing Crawley 
on probation instead of imposing a period of actual suspension, the OPC requests that 
the Court reverse that portion of the Ruling and Order Re: Sanctions and impose a 
suspension upon him. 
DATED: August 3t ^ T , 2006. 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
ato A Tnnmow Kate A. Toomey 
Deputy Counsel 
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Rules of Central Importance Cited in the Brief 
Rule 2. Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
2.1. Scope. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer 
upon a finding or acknowledgement that the lawyer has engaged in 
professional misconduct. 
2.2. Disbarment. Disbarment terminates the individual's 
status as a lawyer. A lawyer who has been disbarred may be 
readmitted as provided in Rule 25 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability. 
2.3. Suspension. Suspension is the removal of a lawyer 
from the practice of law for a specified minimum period of time. 
Generally, suspension should be imposed for a specific period of 
time equal to or greater than six months, but in no event should the 
time period prior to application for reinstatement be more than three 
years. 
(a) A lawyer who has been suspended for six months or less 
may be reinstated as set forth in Rule 24 of the Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability. 
(b) A lawyer who has been suspended for more than six 
months may be reinstated as set forth in Rule 25 of the Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
2.4. Interim suspension. Interim suspension is the 
temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law. Interim 
suspension may be imposed as set forth in Rules 18 and 19 of the 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
2.5. Reprimand. Reprimand is public discipline which 
declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the 
lawyer's right to practice. 
2.6. Admonition. Admonition is nonpublic discipline which 
declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the 
lawyer's right to practice. 
2.7. Probation. Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer 
to practice law under specified conditions. Probation can be public 
or nonpublic, can be imposed alone or in conjunction with other 
sanctions, and can be imposed as a condition of readmission or 
reinstatement. 
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2.8. Resignation with discipline pending. Resignation with 
discipline pending is a form of public discipline which allows a 
respondent to resign from the practice of law while either an 
informal or formal complaint is pending against the respondent. 
Resignation with discipline pending may be imposed as set forth in 
Rule 21 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
2.9. Other sanctions and remedies. Other sanctions and 
remedies which may be imposed include: 
(a) restitution; 
(b) assessment of costs; 
(c) limitation upon practice; 
(d) appointment of a receiver; 
(e) a requirement that the lawyer take the bar examination or 
professional responsibility examination; and 
(f) a requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education 
courses. 
2.10. Reciprocal discipline. Reciprocal discipline is the 
imposition of a disciplinary sanction on a lawyer who has been 
disciplined in another court, another jurisdiction, or a regulatory 
body having disciplinary jurisdiction. 
Rule 3. Factors to Be Considered in Imposing Sanctions, Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
3.1. Generally. 
The following factors should be considered in imposing a 
sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct: 
(a) the duty violated; 
(b) the lawyer's mental state; 
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's 
misconduct; and 
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
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Rule 4. Imposition of Sanctions, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
4.1. Generally. 
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon 
application of the factors set out in Standard 3.1, the following 
sanctions are generally appropriate. 
4.2. Disbarment. 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined 
in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the 
court, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the 
public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious 
interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary 
element of which includes intentional interference with the 
administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, 
extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or 
importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of 
another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to 
commit any of these offenses; or 
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
4.3. Suspension. 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined 
in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
and causes injury or potential injury to a party, the public, or the 
legal system, or causes interference or potential interference with a 
legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the 
elements listed in Standard 4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
4.4. Reprimand. 
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) negligently engages in professional misconduct as 
defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional 
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Conduct and causes injury to a party, the public, or the legal 
system, or causes interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in any other misconduct that involves 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely 
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
4.5. Admonition. 
Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) negligently engages in professional misconduct as 
defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and causes little or no injury to a party, the public, or the 
legal system or interference with a legal proceeding, but exposes a 
party, the public, or the legal system to potential injury or causes 
potential interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in any professional misconduct not otherwise 
identified in this Standard 4 that adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice law. 
Rule 6. Aggravation and Mitigation, Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions. 
6.1. Generally. 
After misconduct has been established, aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances may be considered and weighed in 
deciding what sanction to impose. 
6.2. Aggravating circumstances. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors 
that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be 
imposed. Aggravating circumstances may include: 
(a) prior record of discipline; 
(b) dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) a pattern of misconduct; 
(d) multiple offenses; 
(e) obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally 
failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary authority; 
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other 
deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; 
(g) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the 
misconduct involved, either to the client or to the disciplinary 
authority; 
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(h) vulnerability of victim; 
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law; 
(j) lack of good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; and 
(k) illegal conduct, including the use of controlled 
substances. 
6.3. Mitigating circumstances. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors 
that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be 
imposed. Mitigating circumstances may include: 
(a) absence of a prior record of discipline; 
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) personal or emotional problems; 
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the 
consequences of the misconduct involved; 
(e) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary 
authority prior to the discovery of any misconduct or cooperative 
attitude toward proceedings; 
(f) inexperience in the practice of law; 
(g) good character or reputation; 
(h) physical disability; 
(i) mental disability or impairment, including substance 
abuse when: 
(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or 
mental disability; and 
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally 
contributed to the misconduct; and 
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or 
mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained 
period of successful rehabilitation; and 
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence 
of that misconduct is unlikely; 
(j) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided 
that the respondent did not substantially contribute to the delay and 
provided further that the respondent has demonstrated prejudice 
resulting from the delay; 
(k) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental 
disability or impairment; 
(I) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
(m) remorse; and 
(n) remoteness of prior offenses. 
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6.4. Factors which are neither aggravating nor mitigating. 
The following circumstances should not be considered as 
either aggravating or mitigating: 
(a) forced or compelled restitution; 
(b) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer; 
(c) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary 
proceedings; 
(d) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and 
(e) failure of injured client to complain. 
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Kate A. Toomey, #6446 
Deputy Counsel 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone No. 801 531-9110 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Discipline 
Steven Crawley, #00750 
Respondent. 
of: AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER OF DISCIPLINE 
Civil No. 040905620 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
This matter came on for a combined Adjudication and Sanctions Hearing on Monday, 
November 1, 2005. The Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") was represented by Kate A. 
Toomey, Deputy Counsel. The Respondent, Steven Crawley, was present and represented by his 
attorney, Gregory G. Skordas. The parties had previously stipulated that the matter could be tried 
as a combination Adjudication and Sanctions Hearing. Additionally, the parties entered into 
Stipulated Facts, which are adopted and incorporated herein, prior to the commencement of the 
hearing. 
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The Office of Professional of Conduct called one witness at the hearing: the Respondent, 
Steven Crawley. The Respondent called the following witnesses: Darrel J. Bostwick, Attorney-
at-Law; Charlene Crawley, wife of the Respondent; Steven Crawley, the Respondent; Jeffery 
Price, Attorney-at-Law; and Dr. Lynn Johnson, PhD, a psychologist who treated the Respondent. 
Additionally, the Respondent proffered the character testimony of attorney Randy Birch, and the 
similar testimony of Stella Allen, director of Habitat for Humanity. 
After hearing the testimony and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby enters the 
following: 
STIPULATED FACTS 
1. Steven Crawley is an attorney licensed in the State of Utah and a member of the 
Utah State Bar. 
2. At the time relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Crawley was a shareholder of the law 
firm Babcock, Bostwick, Scott, Crawley and Price ("the firm"). 
3. One of the firm's clients was Interwest Construction. 
4. Crawley represented Interwest Construction in two matters relevant to this 
Complaint - Case One, denominated Pettit Distribution Centers v. Interwest Construction, Case 
No. 000902176, Third Judicial District Court ("the Pettit Distribution matter"), and Case Two, 
denominated Toothman-Orton Engineering v. Interwest Construction, Case No. 1:99CV438, 
United States District Court for the District of Idaho ("the Toothman-Orton matter"). 
2 
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5. The Pettit Distribution matter involved a primary claim against Interwest 
Construction, and Interwest Construction's three third-party claims against Messerly Concrete, 
Western States Waterproofing, and Chemrex. 
6. Interwest Construction's primary claim and the third-party claims in the Pettit 
Distribution matter would have been enhanced by obtaining an expert report or affidavit. 
7. Crawley failed to obtain an expert report or affidavit for the Pettit Distribution 
matter. 
8. In the Fall of 2001 in the Pettit Distribution matter, Interwest Construction lost 
some of its third-party claims for lack of any supporting evidence, including an expert report. 
9. The District Court assessed attorneys' fees against Interwest Construction in two 
third-party claims in the Pettit Distribution matter. 
10. Crawley failed to inform Interwest Construction that its third-party claims were 
dismissed, and that attorneys' fees had been assessed against it in the Pettit Distribution matter. 
11. In the Pettit Distribution matter, the District Court granted partial summary 
judgment against Interwest Construction in March 2002, and the lack of an expert report was part 
of the reason. 
12. Crawley misrepresented the status of the Pettit Distribution matter to Interwest 
Construction. 
13. Crawley misrepresented the status of the Pettit Distribution matter to the firm. 
14. The Toothman-Orton matter involved an action against Interwest Construction for 
breach of contract. 
3 
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15. Interwest Construction counterclaimed against Toothman-Orton for breach of 
contract and negligence. 
16. Interwest Construction's defense against the primary claim and its prosecution of 
the negligence counterclaim against Toothman-Orton depended upon obtaining an expert report 
or affidavit. 
17. On May 2, 2001, the District Court entered summary judgment against Interwest 
Construction on its negligence cross-claim because Interwest Construction failed to present an 
expert affidavit showing Toothman-Orton's cross-claim. The Court noted that its "review of the 
undisputed facts giving rise to the alleged malpractice in this case demonstrates that the matter is 
not of the kind within the ordinary knowledge and experience of laymen.... Interwest was 
therefore required to present an expert affidavit to show any negligence by Toothman-Orton. ... 
Because it failed to do so, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Toothman-Orton on 
Interwest's negligence cross-claim." 
18. Crawley informed Interwest Construction that its counterclaim was dismissed for 
reasons other than the actual reason. 
19. In September 2001, an Amended Judgment was entered for Toothman-Orton 
against Interwest Construction. The total amount of the judgment was $17,007.31. 
20. In the Toothman-Orton matter, Interwest Construction decided to pursue an 
appeal. 
21. Crawley informed Interwest Construction that the firm would appeal the 
judgment, and in fact had filed an appeal on its behalf in the Toothman-Orton matter. 
4 
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22. Crawley did not file an appeal on behalf of Interwest Construction in the 
Toothman-Orton matter. 
23. At the time relevant to this proceeding, Crawley was responsible for the film's 
business affairs and financial management, including renewing its professional negligence 
insurance coverage. 
24. The firm was insured through Medmarc Casualty Insurance Company. 
25. In November 2001, Crawley filled out an application captioned "ProMarc 
Renewal Anniversary Application." 
26. Crawley checked the box marked "No" in response to the following question from 
Medmarc Casualty Insurance Company: "At this time, does any applicant know of any act, 
omission, or circumstance that could reasonable give rise to a professional liability claim against 
any of the following: the firm, any past or present attorneys in the firm, or any predecessor firm." 
27. The application form asserted "The above statements are true and the Applicant 
has not misstated, omitted, or suppressed any material fact(s). It is understood and agreed that 
this Renewal/Anniversary Application and any previously completed Renewal/Anniversary 
Application(s) and/or Application(s) shall be the basis of the contract with the Company and that 
this Renewal Anniversary Application, previously completed Renewal/Anniversary 
Application(s) shall be incorporated into that contract." 
28. Crawley signed the application as the "Authorized Principal or Applicant." 
5 
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29. Crawley should have been aware that his acts and omissions in representing 
Interwest Construction in the Pettit Distribution matter and the Toothman-Orton matter could 
reasonably give rise to a professional liability claim against the firm and/or against Crawley. 
30. Crawley did not disclose to Medmarc Insurance Company that his acts and 
omissions in representing Interwest Construction in the Pettit Distribution matter and the 
Toothman-Orton matter could reasonably give rise to a professional liability claim against him or 
the firm. 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
31. Mr. Crawley violated Rule 1.1 (Competence), Rule 1.2(a) (Scope of 
Representation), Rule 1.3 (Diligence), Rule 1.4(a) (Communication), Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct), 
and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
32. Suspension is the appropriate presumptive sanction after taking into consideration 
the four factors listed under Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
33. The aggravating factors are: 
a. Multiples offenses. 
b. The multiple offenses involved elements of intentional dishonesty, either in 
the form of affirmative misrepresentations, or omissions. 
c. In addition, a third aggravating circumstance is probably Mr. Crawley's 
substantial experience. 
34. The mitigating factors are: 
a. The absence of any other discipline for twenty-eight years. 
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b. Mr. Crawley was suffering from physical, personal, and emotional problems. 
The Court understands this conflates two of the mitigating factors. 
c. Restitution has been made, albeit after the fact and not on his own initiative. 
d. Mr. Crawley enjoys a good character reputation in the community by those 
who he is in a position to know. 
e. Mr. Crawley has displayed substantial remorse. 
35. Two other factors that are not expressly listed are: 
a. Mr. Crawley's candor to the court. The Court thinks he has been absolutely 
candid and has not done anything to evade responsibility. 
b. Mr. Crawley has suffered what the Court accepts to be essentially a one 
hundred and fifty thousand dollar loss of value in the firm. The Court 
understands this equates very closely to the restitution element. 
c. Then there is the question of the imposition of other penalties and sanctions. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. Mr. Crawley violated Rule 1.1 (Competence), Rule 1.2(a) (Scope of 
Representation), Rule 1.3 (Diligence), Rule 1.4(a) (Communication), Rule 8.4(c) (Misconduct), 
and Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
7 
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2. The Court concludes that suspension is the appropriate presumptive sanction after 
taking into consideration the four factors that are listed under Rule 3, Standards for hnposing 
Lawyer Sanctions. 
3. There are several aggravating factors and several mitigating factors that apply in 
this case in various degrees, as set forth above. 
3. The Court concludes that Mr. Crawley should be suspended for one year, but to 
stay that suspension and place him on probation for a period of eighteen months with the 
following conditions: 
a. Mr. Crawley's conduct should be subject to public disclosure in the 
Discipline Comer that reflects the determinations that have been made, 
and what the violations are. 
b. Mr. Crawley should not engage in any litigation during that period of time, 
nor enter any appearance in court. 
c. Mr. Crawley should not advertise at all during that period of time as well. 
d. Mr. Crawley should donate twenty-five hours of pro bono time to clients, 
or Bar-related community service, either through Tuesday Night Bar or 
some other organization as mutually agreed-upon by counsel for the 
parties. 
e. Mr. Crawley should obtain an evaluation. He should be seen by a mental 
health professional of his choice—a doctor he's seeing now or perhaps 
he's seen in the past—eveiy four months so we will have four reports 
8 
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during the period of the suspension. The first one will take place not later 
than thirty days from the date of this hearing, with a report from Dr. 
Johnson, or whoever it is, to the OPC. 
f. If there is a diagnosis or determination that Mr. Crawley has slipped into 
anxiety or depression, he must bring it to the OPC's and the Court's 
attention to be addressed at that point. The Court is not suggesting that the 
suspension will take place, because that is not its intent, only that it be 
monitored to prevent Mr. Crawley from slipping into some episode 
without anybody monitoring what is happening. 
g. Mr. Crawley should commit no further violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
h. Within six months of the date of the sanctions hearing, Mr. Crawley 
should take and pass the Multi-state Professional Responsibility 
Examination. 
ORDER OF DISCIPLINE 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby 
enters its Order of Discipline: 
1. Mr. Crawley shall be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. 
2. The suspension shall be stayed, and Mr. Crawley placed on probation for a period 
of 18 months under the following terms and conditions: 
9 
i I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a. Mr. Crawley's conduct shall be subject to public disclosure in the 
Discipline Comer that reflects the determinations that have been made, 
and what the violations are. 
b. Mr. Crawley shall not engage in any litigation during that period of time, 
nor enter any appearance in court. 
c. Mr. Crawley shall not advertise at all during that period of time as well. 
d. Mr. Crawley shall donate twenty-five hours of pro bono time to clients, or 
Bar-related community service, either tlirough Tuesday Night Bar or some 
other organization as mutually agreed upon by counsel for the parties. 
e. Mr. Crawley shall obtain an evaluation. He shall be seen by a mental 
health professional of his choice—a doctor he's seeing now or perhaps 
he's seen in the past—every four months. The first one shall take place 
not later than thirty days from the date of the hearing, with a report from 
Dr. Johnson, or whoever it is, to the OPC. 
f. If there is a diagnosis or determination that Mr. Crawley has slipped into 
anxiety or depression, he shall bring it to the OPC's and the Court's 
attention to be addressed at that point. 
g. Mr. Crawley shall commit no further violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
h. Within six months of the date of the sanctions hearing, Mr. Crawley shall 
take and pass the Multi-state Professional Responsibility Examination. 
10 
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3. At the expiration of the probationary period, Mr. Crawley shall file a petition 
pursuant to Rule 25, Rules of Discipline and Disability, and the OPC will have the opportunity to 
respond. 
4. Any future complaints against Mr. Crawley shall come directly to the Court's 
attention without proceeding through a Screening Panel hearing. 
11 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of April, 2006 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was sent via prepaid first-class U.S. Postal Service to the following: 
Gregory G. Skordas (#3865) 
SKORDAS, CASTON, HAMILTON & HYDE 
Suite 1104 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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MAR 2 9 2005 
Third JUUIOIQI 
MAR 2 3 201 
OFFICE OF 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THg?fl®^B8©NfiD«^6aS¥L D I S T R I Q & T LAKE COW 
By — 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH Deputy Clerk 
In the Matter of the Discipline 
of: 
MARSHA M. LANG, #4995 
Respondent. 
RULING AND ORDER 
RE: SANCTIONS 
CASE NOS. 010910847 
030908681 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
The first phase of this bifurcated proceeding was tried to the 
Court on November 17, 18 and 19, and December 14, 2004. Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on December 20, 2004. 
The' court • found that Ms. Lang had violated' several Rules -of 
Professional Conduct, as follows: Rule 1.3 (diligence) as to the 
Elsbury and Burch-Knowley matters; Rule 1.4(b) (communication) as 
to the. Elsbury, Willcut, and Burch-Knowley matters; Rule 1.4(a) 
(communication) as to the Willcut and Burch-Knowley matters; Rule 
8.1(b) (failure to respond to the office of Professional Conduct 
regarding complaints) in the Willcut and Burch-Knowley matters; 
Rule 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, 
in this case during the course of a deposition) in the Kelley 
matter; and Rule 8.4(a) in all four matters, based on the findings 
of other, specific, violations of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
After the court entered its Findings and Conclusions, the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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court commenced the sanctions hearing on January 13, 2005, within 
the thirty days required by Rule 11(f), Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability, but the time set aside for hearing proved 
inadequate. The sanctions phase was ultimately heard over several 
days, concluding with the last arguments on March 22, 2005. Prior 
to closing arguments, five witnesses were examined. The Office of 
Professional Conduct was represented by Kate A. Toomey, and 
respondent was represented by Andrew B. Berry. Based upon the 
testimony of the witnesses during both phases of this proceeding, 
the court's Findings and Conclusions, the arguments of counsel, and 
the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and applicable case 
law, the Court now enters its following Ruling and Order imposing 
sanctions against Ms. Lang as a result of the violations previously 
adjudicated: 
Pursuant to the Standards: MA disciplinary sanction is imposed 
on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgement that the lawyer had 
engaged in professional misconduct." Rule 2.1. As indicated 
above, in this case the determination of violations is based on 
this court's Findings and Conclusions, and not on any 
acknowledgement by Ms. Lang. It is true that, during the course of 
the sanctions hearing, acting through counsel, Ms. Lang generally 
accepted the findings without further argument. Nevertheless, to 
the extent there was any acknowledgement, it occurred only after 
the court entered adverse findings, and such acknowledgement cannot 
2 
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be considered in mitigation of the violations for sanctions 
purposes. 
The factors the court must consider in imposing sanctions are 
set forth in Rule 3.1. They are: (a) the duty violated; (b) the 
lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by 
the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or 
mitigating factors. The court believes that these factors, in the 
order stated, are a useful framework for consideration of the 
appropriate sanction (s) in this case: 
(a) The duty (duties) violated. 
The duties violated are set forth above in summary, and in 
detail in the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered December 20, 2004. They will not be repeated in detail 
here, except as necessary to explain the court's Ruling and Order 
below. 
(b) The lawyer's mental state, and 
(c) The potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's 
misconduct. 
Three mental states (intent, knowledge, and negligence) may be 
considered pursuant to the Standards, and the determination of 
which applies has a significant bearing on the presumptive sanction 
for the violation(s), as does the injury factor. The three mental 
states are defined in the Standards as follows: 
"Intent" is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish 
3 
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a particular result. 
'"Knowledge" (or "knowing") is the conscious awareness of the 
nature of the attendant circumstances of the conduct but without 
the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular 
result. 
"Negligence" is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial 
risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which 
failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable 
lawyer would exercise in the situation. 
The Standards also provide definitions for injury and 
potential injury, as follows: 
"Injury" is harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or 
the profession which results from a lawyer's misconduct. The level 
of injury can range from "serious" injury to "little or no" injury; 
a reference to "injury" alone indicates any level of injury greater 
than "little or no" injury. 
"Potential injury" is the harm to a client, the public, the 
legal system or the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at 
the time of the lawyer's misconduct, and which, but for some 
intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the 
lawyer's misconduct. 
The court has very carefully considered the mental state to be 
ascribed to Ms. Lang for each of the adjudicated violations, and 
the injury or potential injury resulting therefrom, if any. No one 
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mental state applies to all occurrences under the facts of Ms. 
Lang's violations. The court first determines that, with the 
exception of the two violations regarding non-responsiveness to the 
OPC, none of the violations includes conduct that could fairly be 
deemed intentional. The court will now consider the mental state 
and resulting injury, if any, of each violation, by complainant: 
In the Elsbury matter the court cannot determine that there is 
sufficient evidence to find that the initial failure to locate and 
forward income verification, etc. was knowing. It is clear; 
however, that in light of the evidence, there was a substantial 
risk that the result would follow from Ms. Lang's failure to 
carefully investigate her files and question her staff, and it was 
manifestly negligent conduct that resulted in actual injury to the 
client (the Order to Show Cause hearing regarding failure to 
produce documents as ordered) as well as potential injury, had 
Judge Henriod found contempt, which would probably have occurred 
but for the judge's active questioning at the hearing (which 
constituted an intervening factor or event). 
On the other hand, Ms. Lang's abandonment of her client at the 
hearing on Order to Show Cause, when she sought to deflect any 
blame from herself or her office, and place it on her client, was 
knowing; that is, the conduct reflected a conscious awareness of 
the facts and circumstances, but the court nevertheless does not 
find a conscious purpose to abandon or harm the client; therefore, 
5 
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intent is not present. Finally, as . to Mr. Elsbury, the court 
determines that Ms. Lang negligently failed to inform him of his 
options such that he could make appropriate decisions, particularly 
regarding representation, and that this failure created significant 
potential harm that would likely have become actual injury, but for 
Judge Henriod's insistence that Ms. Lang represent Elsbury at the 
hearing. The representation did not, in fact, substantially aid 
Mr. Elsbury, but Ms. Lang's presence helped Judge Henriod 
understand the circumstances and fairly allocate fault for the 
failure to provide documents as ordered. 
Ms. Lang's violations in the Willcut matter were primarily 
knowing. Despite Ms. Lang's testimony, the court is persuaded that 
she knew that she failed to respond to repeated requests for 
information, and that she did not keep Ms. Willcut informed 
sufficiently (with or without inquiry) to permit the client to make 
informed decisions. The unusual feature of the Willcut matter is 
that there is ho evidence of actual injury, and given the 
conflicting client instructions, shifting objectives, and 
inconsistencies in Ms. Willcut's claims regarding the underlying 
facts, the court cannot determine even potential injury resulting 
from Ms. Lang's omissions. 
The Kelley matter, which resulted in the court's determination 
that Ms. Lang's conduct during the deposition of her client was 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, was clearly a knowing 
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act. Ms. Lang claimed both ignorance of the rules of conducting 
depositions (based on inexperience) and misunderstanding of the 
state of the law on some specific issues. That may be so, but Ms. 
Lang was inescapably aware of the nature and circumstances of her 
conduct, as the deposition deteriorated into an unproductive and 
argumentative exercise, even if she did not consciously desire that 
result at the outset. The conduct resulted in actual harm, in that 
the deposition had to be taken again (part of the cost of which was 
ultimately borne by Ms. Lang pursuant to court order), and actual 
harm to the client (both Ms. Lang's and the opposing party), the 
legal system and the profession, both of which were cast in an 
unnecessarily bad light. 
The Burch-Knowley matter encompasses several violations. The 
failure to move the matter to a conclusion, when it could have been 
accomplished months earlier but for Ms. Lang's refusal to cooperate 
in providing minimal legitimate discovery to the other side, was a 
knowing act, but one which did not intend the resulting delay. Ms. 
Lang did intend to be obdurate, because she resented opposing 
counsel's request, but that still does not evince an intent to 
cause delay. Nevertheless, delay inevitably occurred, and Ms. Lang 
must have known of the circumstances that led to the delay. 
While Ms. Lang was engaging in conduct that created delay, she 
was knowingly not responsive to her client and she did not provide 
information, particularly between late November, 2001, and March, 
7 
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2002, that either informed her client of the status of the matter 
or permitted the client to make decisions consistent with the 
existing circumstances. All of the foregoing violations resulted 
in actual injury to the client, primarily delay in obtaining 
increased child support, as well as injury to the profession, 
insofar as the opposing counsel was placed in an impossible 
situation with his client, resulting in a loss of confidence and 
termination before the matter concluded, and the reputation of the 
profession suffered significantly in the eyes of both parties and 
also the spouse of the child's father. 
In both the Willcut and Burch-Knowley matters, the court 
further finds that the failure to respond to the OPC requests for 
information and answers to complaints was intentional. The court 
recognizes that as Ms. Lang's problems multiplied, she came to 
believe that responses were futile (in fact, she apparently clings 
to that belief to this day) , but this conscious belief only 
supports the finding that Ms. Lang accordingly made a conscious 
decision to not respond. 
Finally, the court has not addressed the inevitable findings 
of violations of Rule 8.4(a), which follow from the findings of 
other, more specific, misconduct. The court believes that it is 
not necessary to assign a mental state to these violations, but if 
one is required, in each instance the mental state should comport 
with the mental state assigned to the underlying misconduct. 
8 
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In summary, the court finds that failure to respond to the OPC 
was intentional, most of the remaining violations were knowing, but 
some were merely negligent, as set forth in detail above. In all 
but the Willcut matter, the violations created both actual or 
potential injury, and the existence of actual injury predominates. 
The court has found all three mental states, ranging from 
intentional (but only for the failures to respond to the OPC which, 
while important, occurred after the underlying violations), to 
negligent, but the most prevalent state is knowledge, or knowing. 
The court has also found both actual and potential injury in all 
but one matter. Accordingly, the presumptive sanction is 
suspension, and the court must now proceed to consider aggravating 
and mitigating factors that may enhance or reduce the presumptive 
sanction,. 
(d) The existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
The Office of Professional Conduct argues several instances of 
aggravating conduct, and concedes some mitigation. Ms. Lang, of 
course, argues substantial mitigation, and suggests that the only 
possible aggravating factor is that there are four cases at issue, 
but she nevertheless argues that these four cases do not establish 
a pattern of misconduct. The court has carefully considered the 
arguments of both counsel, but in the interests of brevity, the 
court will address only those factors which it deems to be truly in 
controversy. 
9 
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1. Aggravating factors. 
The court will first address factors listed in the Standards, 
in the order listed, then consider any additional factors: 
- Dishonest or selfish motive. The court is persuaded that 
Ms. Lang was dishonest in her excuses proffered to Paula Willcut; 
dishonest in her blaming actions directed against opposing counsel, 
primarily Joseph Bean; and selfish in her candidly stated intent to 
protect herself at Mr. Elsbury's expense in the hearing before 
Judge Henriod. The court does not identify any other specifically 
dishonest or selfish motive or conduct. 
- Pattern of misconduct. If four cases in which violations 
are found (extending over a period of four to five years) do not 
constitute a pattern, the court is not sure what would be required. 
More to the point, the pattern is of similar misconduct, including 
failure to communicate, blaming of clients and opposing counsel, 
and refusal to accept responsibility for the lawyer's own actions. 
- Multiple offenses. See the preceding paragraph. 
- Obstruction of the disciplinary process, etc. The court's 
findings of non-responsiveness in at least two cases, and Ms. 
Lang's admission that she still believes any response and 
cooperation with the OPC to be futile establish this factor beyond 
question. 
Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the 
misconduct, either to the client or the disciplinary authority. 
10 
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The record fully supports such refusal to acknowledge, at least 
until after the court determined certain specific violations, and 
even then the acknowledgements were limited. The greater concern 
for the court, as will be addressed more fully below, is that even 
when Ms. Lang appears to have a will to acknowledge and address 
problems in her professional performance, she appears to lack 
critical insight into her own conduct and the thought processes 
that have created, and to some extent, justified the conduct (that 
is, in Ms. Lang's mind). 
- Substantial experience in the practice of law. This is a 
problematic factor. Ms. Lang now has nineteen years of practice. 
She practiced ten or eleven years before the first violation, but 
it is also true that Ms. Lang had very limited experience (at least 
in 1997) in the areas of practice, and in the specific practice 
activities, involved in the violations. By 2001; however, when 
several relevant events occurred, Ms. Lang's experience was 
considerably greater, and she had focused exclusively (as she still 
does) in family law, and she should be held to the standard of an 
experienced family law practitioner with respect to at least the 
Burch-Knowley and Paula Willcut matters. 
- The foregoing are factors drawn from the Standards, but the 
court finds that the most troubling aggravating factor is Ms. 
Lang's manifest inability to understand some of the more 
fundamental issues involved in her misconduct. As will appear in 
11 
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the mitigation section, below, the court notes and commends Ms. 
Lang for systemic changes that will undoubtedly prevent recurrence 
of some of the violations, but those violations that arise from 
lack of understanding of the advocate's role, a professional's duty 
to put the client's interests above her own, and the professional 
obligation to be candid and courteous with opposing counsel (and 
not engage in dishonest or otherwise improper blaming behavior) are 
troubling characteristics that will need more than systemic 
remedies. 
2. The existence of mitigating circumstances. 
- Absence of a prior record of discipline. There is no prior 
record, but this factor cannot be given great weight, because (1) 
Ms. Lang's practice in family law was relatively new when the first 
instance occurred, and (2) even this case, involving multiple 
violations, is a consolidation of two separate District Court 
filings. Accordingly, had the actions remained separate, at least 
the violations in the later filing would have been preceded by an 
earlier record of discipline. 
- Inexperience in the practice of law. This factor probably 
applies fairly to the Kelley matter, and to a lesser extent to the 
Elsbury matter, but not to the later violations. The court also 
notes that the inexperience of opposing counsel in the Kelley 
deposition, and her sometimes provocative conduct, are factors that 
the court weighs in considering any sanction related to that 
12 
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matter. 
- Unreasonable delay in proceedings. The court only addresses 
this factor because it was urged by Ms. Lang's counsel throughout 
the proceedings. Delay can only refer to the Kelley matter, and 
the court finds that all proceedings were timely initiated and no 
prejudice resulted to Ms. Lang from the fact that the matter was 
not ultimately adjudicated until more than seven years after the 
deposition. First, the initial delay resulted from Ms. Kelley' s 
reasonable decision to delay a disciplinary complaint until the 
underlying litigation was concluded. Second, the OPC acted with 
reasonable speed and within all time limits imposed by statute and 
rule. Third, ultimate disposition was significantly delayed by Ms. 
Lang's own actions, including self-representation, dilatory 
discovery, and consolidation of cases at her request. Finally, the 
sole factual predicate was conduct during one deposition in 1997. 
All parties and the court had benefit of the transcript as a full 
record, and all attorneys present at the deposition (Ms. Lang, her 
associate, Ms. Hayes, and Ms. Kelley) testified in court, and each 
had a clear recollection of the incident; therefore, no prejudice 
was shown. 
- Interim reform. As is alluded to above, Ms. Lang has made 
substantial, and apparently effective, systemic changes. Those 
changes include a message response and documentation protocol, 
improved calendaring, and specific procedures regarding withdrawal 
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as counsel. These steps are genuine and commendable, and the court 
determines that it is unlikely that most of the communication or 
withdrawal of counsel problems will recur. The court makes this 
statement mindful of the testimony of David Lee, because even Mr. 
Lee, who is unapologetically adverse to Ms. Lang, conceded that 
she responded to all messages by at least the second request. In 
addition, Ms. Lang's billing records and her file in the Lee matter 
confirmed that messages were carefully documented and promptly 
returned. 
In addition to systemic changes, Ms. Lang has attended the OPC 
ethics school, and also attended continuing legal education 
regarding deposition practice, but as addressed in the next 
paragraph, it appears to this court that not all lessons were well 
learned. 
- Imposition of other penalties or sanctions. Ms. Lang was 
sanctioned by the trial judge for her conduct in the Kelley matter, 
and that sanction should have acted as a caution regarding conduct 
in future depositions. After reviewing the much more recent 
Marlise Smith deposition (July 21, 2004), the court is persuaded 
that some improvement has occurred, but viewed as a whole, the 
Janaka deposition (at issue in the Kelley matter) and the Marlise 
Smith deposition show a continuing failure on Ms. Lang's part to 
understand both the rules of defending a deposition, and perhaps 
even more importantly, the rules and expectations of professional 
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civility. It appears that the trial court sanctions in the Kelley 
matter taught a very narrow lesson, at best. 
- Remorse. Ms. Lang points to her remorse, but her counsel 
had to concede that remorse delayed until trial is not a legitimate 
factor in mitigation, and that is the only remorse the court 
observed. 
SUMMARY AND ORDER 
After weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
addressed above, the court determines that there is no basis for a 
lesser sanction than the suspension presumed by the Standards. On 
the other hand, based on the aggravating factors, and the court's 
specific concern that beyond systemic adjustments, Ms. Lang appears 
unlikely to address the core, underlying professional failings that 
brought her to this point, disbarment might be justified and 
appropriate. In fact, as the court has wrestled with its options, 
the recurring question is just what sanction might give Ms. Lang 
the best possible chance to make fundamental changes that could 
substantially improve her prospects of practicing law until 
retirement without being plagued by continuing allegations of 
professional misconduct? 
The OPC argues for a suspension of at least six months and one 
day, but the preferred sanction is a one year suspension. As 
already indicated, this court does not believe that the presumption 
of suspension is overcome in this case in any way that would 
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justify the lesser sanctions urged by Ms. Lang. Accordingly, the 
sanction must include suspension, but the court firmly believes 
that a suspension of six months, or even one year, without a more 
proactive component, will do anything to change Ms. Lang's 
professional conduct in the long term. There must be a term of 
actual suspension to bring home the seriousness of this lawyer's 
misconduct, but the court determines that there must also be a 
period of supervised practice to give Ms. Lang a chance to see how 
family law can and should be practiced at the highest levels of 
professional responsibility, with due regard for clients, other 
counsel, and the courts. 
With the foregoing in mind, and consistent with the Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Discipline, as addressed in detail herein, the 
court now makes and enters its following: 
ORDER, suspending respondent Marsha M. Lang from the practice 
of law in the State of Utah for a period of twelve months, 
effective May 15, 2005 (to allow winding up, pursuant to Rule 26, 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability) . The court is, at this 
time, imposing the entire twelve months' suspension, but Ms. Lang 
is hereby granted leave to petition the court to stay all but three 
months of the suspension, on the following conditions: That Ms. 
Lang, at her expense, retain an experienced member of the Utah 
State Bar, who is generally experienced in litigation, and 
specifically experienced in family law, to act as supervisor and 
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mentor for a period of up to nine months. The supervision shall 
include one-on-one counseling regarding practice matters, review of 
files, participation in court and discovery procedures, review of 
documents prepared by Ms. Lang, including specifically 
correspondence to opposing counsel, and review of all aspects of 
Ms. Lang's practice. It is anticipated that the lawyer selected 
(who must be approved by this court1) shall spend approximately 
four hours per week with Ms. Lang (as an average), for up to nine 
months, but the specific time shall ultimately be at the discretion 
of the supervising lawyer, and at a rate of compensation to be 
agreed between Ms. Lang and the lawyer. If Ms. Lang chooses not to 
petition for a stay, she shall serve the full suspension. 
At the end of the suspension period, Ms. Lang may petition for 
reinstatement pursuant to Rule 26, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability. 
The court intends that this Ruling and Order shall be the 
final Order of the court, but either the OPC or Ms. Lang may 
request the court for any modification or clarification that either 
may think necessary to comply with all applicable Rules or to 
1
 The court will stringently consider the qualifications of any prospective supervising lawyer. 
If Ms. Lang washes, the court is willing to provide a list of possible candidates. These names will 
not be persons the court has contacted, but merely experienced family law7 practitioners in whom the 
court reposes confidence based on experience. 
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effect the court's purpose as set forth herein. 
Dated this 29th day of March, 2005. 
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OFFICE OF 
PROFESSIONALCOND0SI.i£ S f e S H i & l C S i S f 
Kate A. Toomey, #6446 
Deputy Counsel 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)531-9110 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the ' 
Discipline of: ] 
Marsha M. Lang, #4995 
Respondent. 
ORDER STAYING THE 
I RESPONDENT'S SUSPENSION 
) AND CONCERNING THE 
I RESPONDENT'S REINSTATEME 
> TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
) UPON TERMINATION OF THE 
i PERIOD OF SUSPENSION 
i Civil No. 010910847 
> Judge Robert K. Hilder 
The matter of the Respondent's Verified Petition for Stay of Suspension 
and Imposition of Supervised Practice came on for hearing before the Court on 
July 26, 2005. The Respondent, Marsha M. Lang, was present and represented 
by Andrew Berry; the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") 
was represented by Kate A. Toomey. The Court having read the Verified 
Petition, the response filed by the OPC, and the Reply to the OPC's Response to 
Petition for Stay and Supervised Practice submitted by Ms. Lang, and being fully 
advised in the premises, does hereby enter its ORDER: 
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1. The effective date of Ms. Lang's twelve-month suspension is May 
1,2005. 
2. The Court hereby stays nine months of Ms. Lang's twelve-month 
suspension, commencing August 1, 2005, upon the following conditions: 
a. During the nine-month period, Ms. Lang shall at her own 
expense retain Gary Howe to act as Ms. Lang's supervisor and mentor. 
b. The supervision shall include one-on-one counseling 
regarding practice matters, review of files, participation in court and 
discovery procedures, review of documents prepared by Ms. Lang, 
including specifically correspondence to opposing counsel, and review of 
all aspects of Ms. Lang's practice. 
c. It is anticipated that Mr. Howe shall spend approximately 
four hours per week with Ms. Lang (as an average), for nine months, but 
the specific time shall ultimately be at the discretion of Mr. Howe, and at a 
rate of compensation to be agreed between Ms. Lang and Mr. Howe. 
3. The OPC shall publish notice in the next Utah Bar Journal that Ms. 
Lang's suspension has been stayed subject to the conditions identified above. 
4. Ms. Lang may petition for reinstatement to the practice of law 
pursuant to Rule 25, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"), except 
that the Court hereby abates the requirement that a suspended respondent 
seeking reinstatement must pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination. 
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5. Pursuant to Rule 25(c), RLDD, Ms. Lang shall serve a copy of the 
petition for reinstatement upon the OPC, and the OPC shall publish notice of the 
petition in the Utah Bar Journal pursuant to the requirements of Rule 25(d), 
RLDD. The OPC shall also notify the complainants pursuant to Rule 25(d), 
RLDD. 
6. Pursuant to Rule 25(f), RLDD, after receiving Ms. Lang's petition for 
reinstatement, the OPC shall either advise Ms. Lang and the Court that it will 
stipulate to Ms. Lang's reinstatement or file a written objection to the petition. 
7. Pursuant to Rule 25(g), RLDD, if the OPC objects to Ms. Lang's 
petition for reinstatement, the Court will conduct a hearing on Ms. Lang's petition. 
If the OPC files no objection, the Court will review the petition without a hearing 
and enter its findings and order. 
Dated this JjJi day oU^ty^, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
^oho^^RoberiK. 'Hilder " 
Third Judicial District Judge /•'/ 
3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of , 2005, I mailed via 
United States mail, first-class postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER STAYING THE RESPONDENT'S SUSPENSION AND 
CONCERNING THE RESPONDENT'S REINSTATEMENT TO THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW UPON TERMINATION OF THE PERIOD OF 
SUSPENSION to: 
Andrew Berry 
62 West Main Street 
P.O. Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
A 
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Summary Chart of 
State Rules Governing Probation and Stayed Suspensions 
Jurisdiction 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
Probation 
Rule 8(h), Alabama Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, provides that 
probation is appropriate only in cases where there is little likelihood 
that the respondent will harm the public during the period of 
probation and where the conditions of probation can be adequately 
supervised. 
Rule 16(a)(3), Alaska Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, provides for 
probation as a sanction. 
Rule 60(a)(5)(B), Arizona Supreme Court Rules, provides that 
probation may be imposed when there is little likelihood that 
Respondent will harm the public during probation and conditions of 
probation can be adequately supervised 
Section 17.E(7), Arkansas Supreme Court Procedures of Regulating 
Professional Conduct of Attorneys at Law, provides that prior to or 
subsequent to the filing of a formal complaint, a panel of the 
Committee may place the lawyer on probation for a period not 
exceeding two years. Probation shall be used only in cases where 
there is little likelihood the lawyer will harm the public during the 
period of rehabilitation and the conditions of probation can be 
adequately supervised. 
Stayed Suspension 
Not identified in rules as a sanction but are 
ordered as "other requirements that the 
Disciplinary Board deems consistent with the 
purposes of lawyer discipline." 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Does not stay suspensions based on compliance 
with conditions 
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California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
District of Colombia 
Florida 
Georgia 
General Standard 1.5(e), California Standards for Attorney Sanctions 
for Professional Misconduct, addition of reasonable conditions, such 
as supervision by a probation monitor may be reasonable and 
appropriate in assessing compliance with any duties or conditions 
imposed 
Rule 251.7, Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that an 
attorney may be placed on probation if they can demonstrate that 
they are unlikely to harm the public during the probationary period, 
can be adequately supervised, are able to practice law without 
causing the courts and the profession to fall into disrepute, and have 
not committed acts warranting disbarment. 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can and has been 
ordered by the Court, in its discretion to fashion whatever discipline 
necessary to protect the public 
Rule 20, Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, 
provides for probation as a sanction. 
Rule XI, Section 3(a)(7), Rules Governing the District of Columbia 
Bar, may not be for more than three years. Imposed in lieu of or in 
addition to other sanctions. 
Rule 3-5.1(c), Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, Respondent may be 
placed on probation for a period not less than 6 months nor more 
than three years or for an indefinite period determined by conditions 
stated in the order. Conditions may include but are not limited to: 
completion of a practice and professionalism enhancement program, 
supervision by a member of the Florida Bar, etc. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
General Standard 1.4(c)(1), California Standards 
for Attorney Sanctions of Professional 
Misconduct, provides that an execution of a 
suspension may be stayed for a period of one to 
five years only if the stay and the performance of 
specified duties by the respondent are consistent 
with Standard 1.3, regarding protection of the 
public, courts, legal profession maintenance ofl 
high legal standards, etc. 
Rule 251.7 allows probation to be imposed in 
conjunction with a suspension, which may be 
stayed in whole or in part (pursuant to Rule 
251.6(b)) 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can] 
and has been ordered by the Court, in its 
discretion to fashion whatever discipline 
necessary to protect the public 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
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Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 506(c)), Idaho Bar Commission Rules, only imposed in cases 
where there is little likelihood that the defendant will harm the public 
during the probation and the probation can be adequately! 
supervised. 
Rule 772, Illinois Supreme Court Rule, imposed only in cases where 
the attorney has demonstrated that he is unlikely to harm the public 
during the period of rehabilitation and the necessary conditions of 
probation can be adequately supervised. Attorney cannot have 
committed acts which warrant disbarment 
Rule 23 Section 3(c), Indiana Rules for Admission to the Bar and the 
Discipline of Attorneys, in cases of misconduct or disability, the Court 
may, in lieu of disbarment or suspension place an attorney on 
probation and permit the attorney to continue practicing law if in its 
opinion such action is appropriate and desirable. The attorney will be 
subject to the conditions and limitations as the Court sees fit to 
impose and upon violation of such conditions the attorney may be 
suspended or disbarred. 
Rule 34.13, Rules of Procedure of the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 
Disciplinary Board, provides for a deferral of "further proceedings 
pending the attorney's compliance with conditions imposed by the 
board for supervision of the attorney for a specified period of time not 
to exceed one year unless extended by the board 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction; however, Rule 203, Kansas 
Supreme Court Rules, Subsection (a)(5) provides for any form of 
discipline or conditions separate from or connected to any other 
discipline that the Supreme Court deems appropriate 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 507(a)(1), Idaho Bar Commission Rules, 
provides that suspensions may be withheld in 
whole or in part, contingent upon the defendant's 
observance of specified conditions 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
No identified in rules as sanction but it appears 
that Rule 23 Section 3(c) allows the Court to 
"stay" a suspension and place the attorney on 
probation. If the attorney violates the conditions 
of probation they may be suspended. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction; however, 
Rule 203, Kansas Supreme Court Rules, 
Subsection (a)(5) provides for any form of] 
discipline or conditions separate from or 
connected to any other discipline that the 
[Supreme Court deems appropriate 
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Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Rule 3.380, Rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, does not 
specifically provide for probations but rather public reprimands 
and/or suspensions with conditions. The "with conditions" clause 
has been used to probate sanctions. 
Rule XIX, Section 10(A)(3), Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement, probation should be used only in cases where there is 
little likelihood that the respondent will harm the public during the 
period of rehabi itation and the conditions of probation can be 
adequately supervised 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 9.121(C), Michigan Court Rules, provides for probation when 
during the subject period the attorney was under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol and the impairment caused or substantially 
contributed to the conduct. Probation must not be contrary to the 
public interest and cannot exceed two years. 
Rule 15(a)(4), Minnesota Rules on Lawyers Professional 
Responsibility, upon conclusion of the proceedings the Court may 
place the lawyer on probationary status for a stated period or until 
further order of the Court, with such conditions as the Court may 
specify and to be supervised by the Director. 
KUIS y(Dj(iii), Kuies or Discipline tor tne Mississippi biaie oarj 
provides for suspensions with or without probation for a fixed period 
nf time) . Rule 5.225(a), Missouri Rules Governing the Missouri Bar and the 
Judiciary, lawyer is eligible for probation if he or she is unlikely to 
harm the public during the period of probation and can be adequately 
supervised; lawyer must be able to practice law w/o causing courtsi 
or profession to fall into disrepute; and cannot have committed an act 
warranting disbarment. Must be imposed for a specified period of^  
time and in conjunction with a suspension 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as a sanction, they have 
developed jurisprudential^ 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 9.106 Michigan Court Rules allows 
reprimands or suspensions with conditions as the 
hearing panel, the board, or the Supreme Court 
may impose. In practice panels are more likely to 
issue a reprimand with conditions than probation. 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but the 
Court routinely imposes stayed suspensions, and 
even imposed one stayed disbarment. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 5.225(a), Missouri Rules Governing the 
Missouri Bar and the Judiciary, Probation 
provides that probations must be imposed in 
conjunction with suspension that may be stayed 
in whole or in part 
T Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Rule 9(C), Montana Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, 
allows lawyer to be placed on probation for such time and conditions 
as are determined to be appropriate. 
Rule 4(A)(3), Nebraska Disciplinary Rules, provides for probation in 
lieu of or subsequent to a suspension. 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but are routinely imposed by 
agreement and/or contested hearing and are upheld by the Supreme 
Court 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 17-206(B), New Mexico Rules Governing Discipline, if the 
record discloses that the respondent can still perform legal services 
with proper supervision the Supreme Court may impose probation or 
other conditions as a type of discipline by itself or may defer the 
effect of the sanctions specified in subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, or 4 
(regarding disbarment, suspension, indefinite suspension, or public 
censure). 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
r\uiu *+.^aj, IMUIui udivuid r\uies IUI Ldwyui uisupmie, piuviues IUI 
probation in cases where there is little likelihood that the attorney will 
harm the public during the supervised period and the conditions of 
Rule V, Section 6.(B)(4), Rules for the Government of the Bar of 
Ohio, probation for a period of time upon conditions as the Supreme 
Court determines, but only in conjunction with a suspension pursuant 
to division (B)(3) of this section. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but are 
routinely imposed by agreement and/or contested 
hearing and are upheld by the Supreme Court 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 17-206(B), New Mexico Rules Governing 
Discipline, provides that the Supreme Court may 
defer the effect of sanctions, including 
suspensions. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
General Statutes of North Carolina section 84-
28(c)(2) allows for suspension for a period of up 
to five years, any portion of which may be stayed. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule V. Section 6. (B)(3) Suspension from the 
practice of law for a period of six months to two 
years subject to a stay in whole or in part 
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Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can and has been 
ordered by the Court, in its discretion to fashion whatever discipline 
necessary to protect the public 
Rule 6.2(a), Oregon State Bar Rules of Procedure, upon 
determination that an attorney should be suspended the trial panel 
may stay the suspension in whole or in part and place the attorney 
on probation for a period no longer than three years. 
Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, Subchapter G 
section 89.291 repsondent attorney may be placed on probation if 
they have demonstrated that they can perform legal services and will 
not cause the legal profession to fall into disrepute; are unlikely to 
cause harm to the public during the period of probation; the 
necessary conditions of probation can be adequately supervised; 
and are not guilty of acts warranting disbarment. 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but the Court can and does 
enter disciplinary orders imposing conditions that are tantamount to 
probation 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 9 Section 8.5, Tennessee Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, 
the imposition of a suspension may be suspended in conjunction 
with a fixed period of probation. Probation shall be used only in 
cases where there is little likelihood that the respondent will harm the 
public during the probationary period and where the conditions of 
probation can be adequately supervised 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, but can 
and has been ordered by the Court, in its 
discretion to fashion whatever discipline 
necessary to protect the public 
Rule 6.1(a)(v), Oregon State Bar Rules ofl 
Procedure, a suspension for any period in BR 
6.1(a)(iii) or 6.1(a)(iv) which may be stayed in 
whole or in part on the condition that designated 
probationary terms are met 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction but the 
Court can and does enter disciplinary orders 
imposing conditions that are tantamount to 
stayed suspensions 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
i 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Rule 9 Section 8.5, Tennessee Rules ofl 
Disciplinary Enforcement, indicates that a 
suspension may be stayed in conjunction with 
fixed period of probation. 
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Texas 
Vermont 
Virginia 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
1 Wyoming 
Rule 15.11, Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, provides that 
fully probated suspensions shall not be used in cases where the 
respondent received a public reprimand or a fully probated 
suspension within the last five years for violation of the same 
rule/rules; the respondent received two or more fully probated 
suspensions within the last five years; or the respondent received 
two or more public reprimands or greater within the last five years for 
conflict of interest, theft, misapplication of fiduciary property, or the 
failure to return a clearly unearned fee. 
Administrative Order 9, Rule 8(A)(6), Vermont Supreme Court 
Administrative Orders and Rules, Probation may be imposed only in 
conjunction with another sanction, reinstatement from disability, 
reinstatement from disbarment, or suspension. Shall be used only in 
cases where there is little likelihood that the respondent will harm the 
public during the probation and the conditions of probation can be 
adequately supervised. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
ELC 13.8, Washington Rules for Enforcement of Lawyer Discipline, a 
respondent who has been sanctioned under 13.1 (disbarred, 
suspended, or reprimanded) or admonished under 13.5(b) may be 
placed on probation for a fixed period of two years or less. 
Rule 3.15(1), West Virginia Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, provides 
for probation. 
Not identified in the rules as a sanction, although the Court 
occasionally imposes "conditions on continued practice." 
Not identified in rules as sanction except as may be appropriate 
under the terms of a diversion contract pursuant to Section 14, 
Wyoming Disciplinary Code 
2.25 and 3.14, Texas Rules of Disciplinary 
Procedure, allow for stayed suspensions. 
Disbarments may not be stayed. 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Not identified in rules as sanction 
Stayed suspension cannot be longer than five 
years pursuant to Section 4(a)(ii), Wyoming 
Disciplinary Code ______] 
This chart was prepared in August 2006 based upon information provided to the OPC by its counterparts in other states. 
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